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WHALES, WHALING, AND THE  
WARMING OCEANS 
Alison Rieser*
Abstract: In its first campaign of ocean diplomacy for the twenty-first cen-
tury, the United States is trying to save the international whaling regime 
from breaking apart over the issue of commercial whaling. On the as-
sumption that a reformed whaling regime could address the challenges 
whales face due to global warming, negotiators have come closer to a 
compromise than any previous attempt. But any effort to maintain a role 
for the International Whaling Commission (IWC) must not undermine 
the application by other regimes of new international norms, which in-
clude protecting the integrity and resilience of marine ecosystems. A 
compromise that does not repudiate the “whales-eat-our-fish” notion un-
derlying the IWC’s current view of the ecosystem approach will hinder 
progress in other ocean governance institutions whose need for reform 
greatly surpasses that of the IWC.
Introduction 
 The great whales have long been a symbol of humanity’s relation-
ship to the oceans. In the nineteenth century, whales were the object of 
the first industrial fishery, and were hunted nearly to extinction.1 After 
World War II, two decades of unrestrained factory-ship whaling in the 
Antarctic decimated the few populations the Yankee whaling ships had 
been unable to reach. The whales’ survival then became a symbol of 
the early environmental movement of the late twentieth century. The 
slogan “save the whales” was a call to arms to save the planet from hu-
manity’s folly. Now, in the twenty-first century, whales are sentinels for 
the large-scale changes that global warming and ocean industrialization 
are bringing to the seas.2 They have also become a symbol of human-
                                                                                                                      
*Dai Ho Chun Distinguished Chair in Arts and Sciences, Department of Geography, 
University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Honolulu, Hawai’i, and Emerita Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Maine School of Law, Portland, Maine. An earlier version of this paper was pre-
sented at a symposium on the great whales of the North Atlantic at Boston College Law 
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1 See generally Andrew Darby, Harpoon into the Heart of Whaling (2008). 
2 Thomas J. O’Shea & Daniel K. Odell, Large-Scale Marine Ecosystem Change and the Con-
servation of Marine Mammals, 89 J. Mammalogy 529, 529–31 (2008). 
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kind’s inability to find common ground and cooperate to protect the 
global environment.3
 When nations agreed to a worldwide moratorium on the hunting 
of whales in the early 1980s, they fulfilled a central goal of the 1972 
U.N. Conference on the Environment in Stockholm.4 But the conser-
vation movement behind the moratorium was never able to resolve a 
basic question: should whaling be banned permanently or, if and when 
whale populations recover, should they again be hunted for “sustain-
able use”? As the climate crisis brings unprecedented changes to spe-
cies, ecosystems, and the access of different peoples to the Earth’s re-
sources, this unresolved question overshadows and undermines 
institutions we have with which to address these changes. 
 In its first major undertaking in ocean diplomacy of the twenty-first 
century, the United States began a campaign to save one of the oldest 
elements of the public order of the oceans, the international regime 
for the regulation of whaling. The deliberations of the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC), the management body created by treaty 
in 1946, have deteriorated into an annual confrontation between the 
proponents of conflicting values: biodiversity preservation versus con-
sumptive use of marine wildlife. The whaling regime has been verging 
on dissolution over the issue of commercial whaling for almost two 
decades. While this existential struggle has been waged, some state par-
ties to the regime have sought quietly to turn its attention to the chal-
lenges cetaceans face from climate change, to position the IWC to en-
gage with other international regimes to ensure whales survive the 
coming changes.5
 U.S. whaling diplomacy appears to assume that the international 
regime for whale conservation is worth saving: an accommodation that 
removes the commercial whaling issue from the IWC’s agenda will free 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millenium: International Institu-
tions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies, 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1, 
48 (2005); see also 60th Annual Meeting of the Int’l Whaling Commission [IWC], Santiago, 
Chile, June 23–27, 2008, The Future of the International Whaling Commission: Strengthening 
Ocean Diplomacy, at 5, Doc. IWC/60/12rev (May 2008) (prepared by Calestous Juma, Special 
Advisor to the IWC) [hereinafter IWC 60th Annual Meeting], available at http://www.iwc 
office.org/_documents/commission/IWC60docs/60-12rev.pdf. 
4 Carlarne, supra note 3, at 7. 
5 See William C.G. Burns, From the Harpoon to the Heat: Climate Change and the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission in the 21st Century, 13 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 335, 347–51 
(2001). The whaling treaty is formally known as the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). ICRW, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 
(amended 2008). The ICRW is implemented in U.S. law by the Whaling Convention Act of 
1949, 16 U.S.C. §§ 916–916l (2006). 
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that body to address the numerous environmental challenges that ceta-
ceans face today, from climate change and marine pollution to colli-
sions with vessels and fishing gear.6 In this optimistic view, the IWC 
could become the keystone species in the “ecosystem” of international 
ocean institutions.7 However, the norms that underlie ocean govern-
ance in the twenty-first century have been forged in an era of resource 
scarcity, declining ocean health, and recognition of the interdepend-
ence of governance institutions across temporal and spatial scales. Col-
lectively referred to as the precautionary and ecosystem approaches, 
these principles and norms are almost diametrically opposed to those 
that underlie the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW), the IWC’s constitutive document.8
 For the last decade, one contracting government to the IWC— 
Japan—has presented legal and scientific arguments for lifting the 
moratorium on commercial whaling. Stressing the need for adherence 
to international law, this State relies upon the text of the ICRW to rein-
force its view that ecosystem-based management of oceans prioritizes 
human needs.9 As long as the ICRW remains in force, Japan is likely to 
continue to rely upon that treaty’s approval of consumptive use of 
whales to support its view that whaling must be allowed as “sustainable 
                                                                                                                      
6 In 2007, a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) mounted a cam-
paign to convince President George W. Bush to direct his administration to do everything 
it could to continue the global moratorium on the hunting of whales. By the time the 
campaign was launched, however, the chief U.S. official responsible for international whal-
ing policy had already begun a campaign to broker a compromise to preserve the IWC and 
to keep the pro-whaling countries from abrogating the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling. The NGO coalition feared that U.S. delegates were so intent on 
reaching a compromise with pro-whaling nations that they may be tempted to agree to a 
new type of whaling, that of “small type coastal whaling” by vessels in Japan and Norway. See 
International Whaling Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans 
of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Congress (2008) (statement of Patrick R. 
Ramage, Global Whale Program Director, International Fund for Animal Welfare). U.S. 
diplomats believe the global whaling regime, based upon the ICRW, although dysfunc-
tional for the past two decades, should be preserved, and that over time the treaty can be 
amended or finessed to allow the IWC to contribute to the conservation and management 
of cetaceans and other marine mammals. See International Whaling Commission: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th 
Congress (2008) [hereinafter Hogarth Statement] (statement of William T. Hogarth, U.S. 
Comm’r, International Whaling Commission). 
7 IWC 60th Annual Meeting, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining that uncertainties about the 
state of marine ecosystems represent an opportunity to position the IWC as a “flagship 
organization in ocean diplomacy and science-based conservation and management”). 
8 See generally Duncan Currie, Whales, Sustainability and International Environmental Gov-
ernance, 16 Rev. Eur. Community & Int’l Envtl. L. 45 (2007). 
9 See Joji Morishita, Multiple Analysis of the Whaling Issue: Understanding the Dispute by a 
Matrix, 30 Marine Pol’y 802, 804–05 (2006). 
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use.”10 But as long as a majority of other parties to the treaty reject this 
view, Japan is likely to continue to misuse the treaty’s special permit 
provisions to support a growing consumptive take of whales and to 
characterize that unilateral “harvest” as science- and ecosystem-based 
management.11 It is not clear that a diplomatic agreement to put aside 
debates over commercial or “scientific” whaling—or anything short of 
international adjudication—will be sufficient to prevent these legal and 
scientific claims from detracting from the ability of other ocean regimes 
to apply a truly precautionary and ecosystem approach to governance. 
 Over the course of the last two decades, during which the collapse 
of the international whaling regime has been imminent, our under-
standing of marine ecosystems and how human activities affect them 
has advanced. Ocean governance institutions have been slow to incor-
porate this knowledge, choosing instead to focus on maximizing the 
extraction of marine wildlife for human consumption and appropriat-
ing ocean space and minerals for human use.12 The need for reform of 
these institutions greatly surpasses the need for reform of the whaling 
regime, especially in light of climate change and its impacts on ecosys-
tems. Any effort to maintain a role for the IWC in ocean governance 
must be part of the overall transformation of ocean institutions to pre-
caution- and ecosystem-based management that emphasizes resource 
protection over exploitation. Otherwise, such effort risks being judged 
as the diplomatic equivalent of fiddling while Rome is burning.13
 This Article begins with a brief review of the long-range challenges 
facing whales in light of ocean warming and what whales require from 
international governance. It then considers the recent efforts to reform 
the IWC and the premise that it could, if the moratorium stalemate 
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. at 804. 
11 See generally Phillip J. Clapham et al., The Whaling Issue: Conservation, Confusion, and 
Casuistry, 31 Marine Pol’y 314 (2007). 
12 See, e.g., Carl Safina & Dane H. Klinger, Collapse of Bluefin Tuna in the Western Atlantic, 
22 Conservation Biology 243, 243–44 (2008). The collapse of the bluefin tuna is only 
one of many examples of management failure, where scientific advice is ignored due to 
industrial lobbying, inability of parties to agree on common goals for shared resources, 
and interference with management by elected officials on behalf of their industrial con-
stituencies. See id. at 245. 
13 The whaling industry was the first industrial fishery in the world, and its history 
should inform all policies on what the role of industrial fisheries should be in the new 
realities of altered marine ecosystems, global warming, and decreasing food and health 
security of coastal communities affected by global warming. If whaling were still being 
carried out by several nations, the IWC would be the most notoriously ineffective regional 
fishery management body. Instead, in view of the moratorium and the impending collapse 
of the Atlantic bluefin tuna, that honor would likely be bestowed upon the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. See id. at 243. 
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were resolved, contribute to the protection of marine ecosystems that 
whales depend on as they face the unprecedented challenge of global 
climate change. A particularly troubling aspect of the current reform 
discussions is the assertion that “normalization” of the regime is in fact 
consistent with an ecosystem approach, the emerging norm of interna-
tional environmental governance. This rationale happens to coincide 
with the latest rationale the pro-whaling nations give for restarting 
commercial whaling, that culling top predators is needed in order to 
secure human food supplies. A brief look at the management regime 
for the burgeoning Antarctic krill fishery tests the premise that the IWC 
can function as an advocate for the whales to ensure other ocean re-
gimes protect their ecosystems on a precautionary basis. 
I. Long-Term Threats to Cetaceans 
 A 2008 study published in the journal Science reveals the magni-
tude of the human footprint on the oceans.14 Few, if any, areas of the 
oceans are free from human impacts.15 These impacts reduce the 
amount of habitat suitable for whales to live in, challenging their ability 
to recover from the factory-whaling era. For example, shipping noise in 
the ocean increases exponentially with each decade, degrading the un-
derwater acoustic environment whales depend on for communicating 
and locating prey.16 Noise pollution may force whales out of the habitat 
where they are most likely to find prey, even as those prey fields are 
changing in response to ocean warming, further reducing the likeli-
hood of population recovery.17
 Ship strikes, entanglement in fishing gear, and ecological interac-
tions with fisheries pose additional challenges to whales. The number 
of cetaceans that die or are weakened by these forms of habitat degra-
dation vastly outnumber the number of whales deliberately killed by 
whaling.18 The North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis), for ex-
                                                                                                                      
 
14 Benjamin S. Halpern et al., A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems, 319 
Science 948, 949 (2008) (noting that forty-one percent of the world’s oceans are affected 
by multiple anthropogenic drivers of ecological change). 
15 See id. at 950 fig.2. 
16 See O’Shea & Odell, supra note 2, at 531. 
17 See Peter L. Tyack, Implications for Marine Mammals of Large-Scale Changes in the Marine 
Acoustic Environment, 89 J. Mammalogy 549, 554–55 (2008). Tyack estimates that certain 
noises, like military and commercial sonar and seismic exploration, are especially damag-
ing and could have a population-level effect equivalent to an increase in predation, that is, 
to a commercial whaling quota. See id. at 555. 
18 See, e.g., Mike Iliff, Normalization of the International Whaling Commission, 32 Marine 
Pol’y 333, 335 (2008) (explaining that pollution, anthropogenic undersea noise, bycatch, 
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ample, occupies a greatly contracted range along the eastern seaboard 
of North America, and its population numbers in the few hundreds.19 
Right whales use their baleen to strain large quantities of the copepod 
Calanus finmarchicus from the water.20 Mother whales and their calves 
migrate along the coast from the calving grounds off Georgia and Flor-
ida to find the dense swarms near Cape Cod and the Bay of Fundy in 
the spring and summer.21 These migrations, however, take them 
through some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and densest fields of 
stationary fishing gear, including millions of lobster traps and their as-
sociated lines and buoys.22 At least eighteen right whales from a popu-
lation of about 350 have been lost to the slow death from gear-
entanglement injuries since 1986.23 Since 1970, another twenty-four 
right whales have been killed by ship strikes.24 As shipping intensifies 
with global trade, the percentage of unnatural mortality of great whales 
that is due to shipping is likely to grow.25
 The human race’s competition with whales for ocean space may 
soon be joined by its competition with whales for prey. Although there 
is currently no commercial fishery for Calanus finmarchicus, Norwegian 
                                                                                                                      
and ship strikes are “known to kill many times the number of whales killed annually by 
whaling activities”). The member states of the IWC have acknowledged that the great 
whales face a host of significant environmental challenges. Mortality from these sources far 
exceeds that of all whaling, including the commercial whaling carried out under objec-
tions to the moratorium, aboriginal subsistence whaling, and the special permit whaling 
under Article VII whaling (“scientific whaling”). See id. (noting that the total annual har-
vest under all forms of whaling is about 3000, including aboriginal subsistence whaling 
(300), Japan’s Article VII whaling (2000), Norway’s EEZ commercial whaling under objec-
tion (650), and Iceland’s EEZ commercial whaling (100)). 
19 Robert D. Kenney, North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Southern Right Whales, in Ency-
clopedia of Marine Mammals 806, 808 (William F. Perrin et al. eds., 2002). 
20 Mark F. Baumgartner et al., Enormous Carnivores, Microscopic Food, and a Restaurant 
That’s Hard to Find, in The Urban Whale: North Atlantic Right Whales at the 
Crossroads 138, 143 (Scott D. Kraus & Rosalind M. Rolland eds., 2007). 
21 See id. at 155. 
22 See generally Amanda J. Johnson et al., The Entangled Lives of Right Whales and Fisher-
men: Can They Coexist?, in The Urban Whale, supra note 20, at 380. 
23 Andrew J. Read, The Looming Crisis: Interactions Between Marine Mammals and Fisheries, 
89 J. Mammalogy 541, 543 (2008). It may take as long as several months for a large whale 
to die from entanglement injuries and starvation, raising animal welfare issues as well as 
the risk of extinction. Id. (citing Michael J. Moore et al., Right Whale Mortality: A Message 
from the Dead to the Living, in The Urban Whale, supra note 20, at 358, 368). 
24 Amy R. Knowlton & Moira W. Brown, Running the Gauntlet: Right Whales and Ship 
Strikes, in The Urban Whale, supra note 20, at 410, 410. 
25 See id. at 412–13. An examination of anecdotal records from the 1970s through the 
1990s indicates that between thirteen and twenty percent of all large whale strandings 
(where carcasses wash ashore) in the United States, Italy, France, and South America were 
due to ship strikes. Id. 
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companies are developing a Calanus fishery in the Barents Sea to pro-
duce fish meal for salmon farms.26 Given the common pattern of 
boom-and-bust fishing from one species to another down the marine 
food web,27 and the growing demand for sea-farmed salmon, it is not 
inconceivable that a similar fishery could develop in the Gulf of Maine. 
Furthermore, a Calanus fishery in the Eastern North Atlantic could af-
fect the current-driven supply of copepods to U.S. waters.28 On the 
other side of the world, the fishery for Antarctic krill (Euphausia su-
perba), the most important prey species in the Southern Ocean ecosys-
tem, is on the verge of a major expansion, just as krill populations are 
decreasing, likely in response to climate change.29
 The greatest long-term threat to the North Atlantic right whale 
and all cetaceans, however, is the synergistic effect of climate change 
with these sources of habitat alteration. Warming oceans will alter the 
conditions that make life in the oceans possible for whales, through 
acidification, changing oceanographic conditions, reduction in habitat 
for prey species, and changes to processes upon which marine ecosys-
tems depend.30 Migratory species like whales may be required to travel 
greater distances to find areas where large quantities of their prey spe-
cies aggregate.31 Greater travel distances will affect the energetics of 
whales and could affect mating and reproductive success.32
                                                                                                                      
 
26 See Rachel G. Tiller, The Norwegian System and the Distribution of Claims to Redfeed, 32 Ma-
rine Pol’y 928, 928 (2008) (noting Norway’s heavy investment in research on a potential 
Calanus fishery in the waters surrounding Norway as a replacement for dwindling popula-
tions of fish species used for fishmeal and fish oil). In March 2006, the Norwegian govern-
ment put a moratorium on plankton harvesting in order to research the ecological effects of 
a fishery before it commences. Rachel G. Tiller, New Resources and Old Regimes: Will the 
Harvest of Zooplankton Bring Critical Changes to the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone? 7 
(Mar. 26–30, 2008) (unpublished paper presented at International Studies Assoc. 49th An-
nual Meeting, San Francisco, CA), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252114_ 
index.html. At least one commercial enterprise already exists and is marketing nutritional 
supplements made from Calanus. See Calanus AS, About Us, http://www.calanus.no/ 
About.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
27 See Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 Science 860, 863 (1998). 
28 See Robert D. Kenney, Right Whales and Climate Change: Facing the Prospect of a Green-
house Future, in The Urban Whale, supra note 20, at 436, 448. 
29 See Virginia Gascon & Rodolfo Werner, CCAMLR and Antarctic Krill: Ecosystem Man-
agement Around the Great White Continent, 7 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 14, 16 (2006); 
Angus Atkinson et al., Letter to the Editor, Long-term Decline in Krill Stock and Increase in 
Salps Within the Southern Ocean, 432 Nature 100, 102–03 (2004). 
30 See generally Burns, supra note 5. 
31 60th Annual Scientific Committee Meeting of the IWC, Santiago, Chile, June 1–13, 
2008, Assessing the Impacts of Future 2˚C Global Warming on Southern Ocean Cetaceans, at 15, IWC 
Doc. SC/60/E3 (May 30, 2008) (prepared by Cynthia Tynan & Joellen Russell) [hereinafter 
IWC Scientific Committee Meeting], available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_ 
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 Acidification may make some species less abundant, especially the 
invertebrates that whales and other marine life consume. Like the reef-
building corals—corals that use carbonate to build their colonies— 
these prey species may find fewer carbonate ions with which to build 
their shells as the oceans absorb more and more carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere and ocean pH decreases.33 This reduced availability of 
carbonate will be especially pronounced in the cold Arctic and Antarc-
tic waters where many cetaceans live.34 Beaked and sperm whales may 
find fewer squids as those species decline in acidified oceans.35
 Climate change is especially challenging for whale species that are 
already at greatly reduced population levels.36 Calanus, the right 
                                                                                                                      
 
russell30may08_tynan.doc. For example, the frontal zones in the Antarctic where krill are 
abundant are likely to move as the sea-ice coverage declines with warming seas. Id. This will 
affect all baleen whale species in the Antarctic including humpback, blue, fin and minke 
whales. Id. 
32 See generally id. Despite the increasing certainty that surrounds the latest predictions 
of climate change, it is difficult to assess the global impacts of climate change on cetace-
ans. The scientific evidence indicates that climate change is likely to decrease or restrict 
the preferred habitat of all cetacean species listed as threatened on the IUCN Red List for 
which projections can be made. Because the polar regions are changing most rapidly, it is 
here that whales may experience the greatest impacts. For example, in the Southern 
Ocean, under a scenario of a two degree Celsius warming, sea ice could be decreased by 
ten to fifteen percent with regional losses of up to thirty percent. See id. at 7–8. The loss of 
sea ice will affect the extent and distribution of habitat of species like the Antarctic minke 
whale. With this level of ice loss, the remaining populations could be crowded into the 
remaining suitable sea-ice habitat, competing with other marine wildlife for food and 
space leading to further reductions in the availability of prey and in the size of these wild-
life populations. Loss of the sea ice would also reduce the availability of Antarctic krill, 
Euphasia superba, the principal prey species for whales in the Southern Ocean. Loss of sea 
ice adversely affects krill in two ways: it can reduce the amount of its preferred habitat and 
the availability of its preferred food. Atkinson et al., supra note 29, at 102. A loss of up to 
twenty-five percent will increase by a corresponding amount the area of open ocean and of 
phytoplankton blooms, and greater blooms may lead to changes in the ecology of phyto-
plankton, reducing the amount of the large diatoms that krill like to eat and increasing 
the species (cryptophyes) that they do not. See IWC Scientific Committee Meeting, supra 
note 31, at 14. 
33 See The Royal Society, Ocean Acidification Due to Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, 
Policy Doc. 12/05, 20 ( June 2005) (prepared by John Raven et al.), available at http:// 
royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13539; see also Wendy Elliott, WWF Int’l, Whales 
in Hot Water? The Impact of a Changing Climate on Whales, Dolphins and Por-
poises: A Call for Action 10 (Mark Simmonds, ed., 2007), available at http://assets.panda. 
org/downloads/climatechange16ppfinallo.pdf. 
34 See Elliott, supra note 33, at 10. 
35 Id. at 10. 
36 See generally Charles H. Greene & Andrew J. Pershing, Climate and the Conservation Bi-
ology of North Atlantic Right Whales: The Right Whale at the Wrong Time?, 2 Frontiers in 
Ecology & Env’t 29 (2004). Again, the plight of the North Atlantic right whale illustrates 
the synergistic impacts of the transitory environmental change and climate change. Deaths 
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whale’s prey, is swept into the Gulf of Maine from sub-polar regions be-
cause of the particular interplay of atmospheric and hydrologic condi-
tions of the North Atlantic.37 If these conditions change as is predicted 
with ocean warming and the melting of polar ice, the abundance and 
distribution of this zooplankton is likely to change as well. Scientists 
predict that Calanus will survive global warming.38 But the ability of 
right whales, with such low population numbers, to find Calanus in 
concentrations adequate to support reproduction is in serious doubt.39 
Similarly, the blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus), reduced from a popu-
lation of roughly half a million in 1900 to less than 5000 today, may not 
be able to survive a reduction in Antarctic krill.40
 The ability of cetaceans to adapt to warming-induced changes in 
the ocean may depend on whether we can improve the quality of their 
environments and thus enhance their resilience. This requires that we 
use our governance institutions to reduce human-caused mortality 
from pollution, ship strikes, fishing-gear entanglement, and ocean 
noise, and the reduced health of individuals and populations that these 
conditions can lead to.41 Global, regional, and national institutions that 
govern fisheries must take seriously the emerging norms requiring pre-
caution and an ecosystem approach. Merely paying them lip service 
through non-binding resolutions and action plans will not be enough.42 
Unfortunately, while many cetacean species face increasing urbaniza-
tion of the coastal and offshore waters they utilize for migration and 
calving, the willingness of shipping, fishing and other marine indus-
tries, and the military to alter their practices to reduce these threats is 
                                                                                                                      
from ship strikes and entanglement in fishing gear exceed the population growth rate and 
increase the likelihood of the species’ extinction. See id. at 30. If mortality from these 
sources stays at current levels or increases, mother whales will not be able to explore and 
find the new places and timing of blooms of their zooplankton prey and pass on the 
knowledge of new feeding areas to their young. See id. at 30–31. 
37 Id. at 31 fig.2. 
38 Jim Provan et al., High Dispersal Potential Has Maintained Long-Term Population Stability 
in the North Atlantic Copepod Calanus Finmarchicus, 276 Proc. Royal Soc’y B: Biological 
Sci. 301, 305–06 (2009) (indicating Calanus has enough genetic diversity to be able to 
adapt). 
39 Eliminating mortality from these immediate anthropogenic threats will increase the 
number of mother-and-calf pairs that may stray into areas where they will encounter the 
new locations of Calanus and learn how to find them again. See Kenney, supra note 28, at 
453. 
40 Elliott, supra note 33, at 10. 
41 See id. at 5. 
42 See Currie, supra note 8, at 50. 
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not keeping pace, and institutions are not changing fast enough to re-
quire them to do so.43
 This institutional failure is particularly apparent with respect to 
marine fisheries. While the oceans are being urbanized by a host of 
other industries,44 fishing fleets have functioned as “roving bandits,” 
responding to global markets and seafood demand with sequential de-
pletion of virtually all marine resources, starting with the large preda-
tory fish and moving down through the marine food web to successively 
lower trophic levels.45 Because many nations and international man-
agement bodies have not managed industrial fisheries effectively, fish 
populations around the world have been depleted.46 Collectively, we 
have removed both large quantities of fish and entire trophic levels.47
 The great whales were the first species to fall victim to the “roving 
bandits” phenomenon, and the IWC was the first ineffective fishery 
management body.48 Member states used the IWC as a whalers’ club 
                                                                                                                      
 
43 See, e.g., Robbie Brown, U.S. Requires Ships to Cut Speed in Waters Used by Right Whales, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2008, at A19. The final regulations setting speed limits on merchant 
shipping to and from U.S. ports when right whales are present, first proposed in 2006, 
were published in late 2008. Final Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce the 
Threat of Ship Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,173 (Oct. 10, 
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224). The U.S. Navy’s opposition to court-imposed 
restrictions on the use of sonar in military exercises to prevent damage to whales was vin-
dicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
365, 381 (2008) (invalidating lower court injunction imposing mitigation measures on 
Navy sonar exercises to protect whales for giving inadequate weight to military readiness 
needs). 
44 See, e.g., Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and Ocean Industrialization, 82 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1355, 1356 (2008). 
45 F. Berkes et al., Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources, 311 Science 1557, 
1557–58 (2006). 
46 Food & Agriculture Org. of the U.N., The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 2006, at 29 (2006) available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0699e/ 
a0699e.pdf. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 
in 2005, twenty-five percent of the world’s marine fisheries (the ones that rely on capturing 
wild stocks) were overexploited, depleted, or recovering from depletion; fifty-two percent 
were fully exploited; twenty percent were moderately exploited; and three percent were 
underexploited. Id. 
47 See Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Com-
munities, 423 Nature 280, 282 (2003) (noting that in a fifteen-year period following World 
War II, industrialized fisheries removed eighty percent of large predatory fish communities 
across a wide range of ecosystems). Many marine ecosystems have experienced a decline in 
the average trophic level of fish catches over the past fifty years, a sign that “fishing down 
marine food webs” is occurring. Pauly et al., supra note 27, at 860. 
48 The history of the IWC’s management of the whaling industry has been recounted 
and analyzed from various perspectives. See, e.g., 1 Patricia Birnie, International Regu-
lation of Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to Conservation of Whales 
and Regulation of Whale-Watching 1–12 (1985); Phillip J. Clapham & C. Scott Baker, 
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rather than a mechanism to constrain their factory whaling fleets and 
protect whale populations as called for in the whaling treaty. Acting to-
gether through the IWC, these fishing states set a precedent for inter-
national neglect in managing industrial fisheries that continues to this 
day at virtually all international fisheries bodies, a pattern of disregard-
ing scientific evidence that catch rates are unsustainable and affording 
the industrial fishing sector a degree of political access and success dis-
proportionate to its economic and social value.49
 Even if commercial whaling does not recommence, whales will 
continue to be affected by roving-bandit fishing fleets through their 
serial depletion of marine wildlife and the resulting ecological impacts 
of fishing that are making ecosystems less resilient in the face of ocean 
warming.50 To protect whales and other marine life from this fate, 
ocean governance institutions must begin to focus on the impact of 
ocean warming on whales’ habitat and prey, to ratchet down fishing 
pressure on ecosystems, and to prevent new fisheries from developing 
that will compound the ecological challenges. 
 New fisheries for prey species that are critical to the functioning of 
marine food webs and ecosystems should be subject to the most pre-
cautionary and ecosystem-based approach. Krill and copepod harvest-
ing, for example, are already increasing with the development of new 
technologies and new products.51 These methods allow for the con-
tinuous extraction and near-simultaneous processing by very large fish-
ing trawlers built by companies that manufacture feeds for salmon and 
other finfish aquaculture, and products for the burgeoning consumer 
health products market.52 As these new industries grow, the demands 
                                                                                                                      
 
Modern Whaling, in Encyclopedia of Marine Mammals, supra note 19, at 1328, 1328–
32; Michael Heazle, Scientific Uncertainty and the International Whaling Commission: An Alter-
native Perspective on the Use of Science in Policy Making, 28 Marine Pol’y 361, 361–74 (2004); 
see also Carlarne, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that the IWC has undergone a normative transi-
tion from a “whaling club” to an agent of conservation). 
49 See, e.g., Safina & Klinger, supra note 12, at 245; Carl Safina, Bluefin Tuna in the West 
Atlantic: Negligent Management and the Making of an Endangered Species, 7 Conservation 
Biology 229, 233 (1993). 
50 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, In Dead Water: Merging of Climate 
Change with Pollution, Over-Harvest, and Infestations in the World’s Fishing 
Grounds (Christian Nellemann et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/ 
InDeadWater_LR.pdf. (discussing the cumulative effects of human activities on the oceans). 
51 See Stephen Nicol & Jacqueline Foster, Recent Trends in the Fishery for Antarctic Krill, 16 
Aquatic Living Res. 42, 42–43 (2003). 
52 See Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 16; see also infra text accompanying notes 
122–29. Aker BioMarine, the company operating the new vessel technology in Atlantic 
sector of the Southern Ocean has applied for eco-labeling certification from the Marine 
Stewardship Council. Press Release, Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), Antarctic Krill 
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placed upon the oceans will grow even greater, just as whales need to 
adapt to the reduced abundance and changing spatial distribution 
brought about by ocean warming.53 Fisheries for species that are prey 
for whales and other marine predators—for example, seabirds, sharks, 
and polar bears—are especially in need of a new norm for manage-
ment, one based on estimates of the health of the entire ecosystem and 
not just the size of the exploitable biomass of the prey species. 
II. New Ocean Governance Norms and the International 
Whaling Regime 
 Given the realities of a warming ocean and its projected ecological 
impacts, how likely are ocean governance bodies to break with past 
practice and begin to apply precaution- and ecosystem-based ap-
proaches to their mandates? More specifically, would resolution of the 
commercial whaling stalemate free the International Whaling Commis-
sion (IWC) to promote ecosystem-based management of fisheries and 
other ocean industries to improve the prospects for cetaceans? To con-
sider this question we must take a closer look at the ecological argu-
ments that have been made in the context of the whaling stalemate, 
including the rationale that pro-whaling member states give for seeking 
a resumption of whaling.54 This shows, unfortunately, that the IWC’s 
current characterization of the “ecosystem approach” is widely diver-
gent from the emerging norm in international environmental law. It is 
therefore difficult to envision the IWC regime as an effective ambassa-
dor for cetaceans and their ecological requirements in other interna-
tional governance bodies, especially those involving fisheries. In man-
agement decisions for the growing Antarctic krill fishery, for example, 
if the IWC’s contribution reflects the whaling regime’s view of the eco-
system approach, this will lay a very poor foundation for governing 
fisheries and other activities in the Southern Ocean. 
A. The Law of the Sea and the Emerging Norms of Precaution and Ecosystem-
Based Management 
 The Law of the Sea Convention created a new framework for 
ocean governance that sought to balance the interests of coastal states 
                                                                                                                      
Fishery Enters Marine Stewardship Council Full Assessment (Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
MSC Press Release], available at http://www.msc.org/newsroom/press_releases/archive-
2008/antarctic-krill-fishery-enters-marine-stewardship. 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
54 See discussion infra notes 93–96. 
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with broader community interests in the utilization of ocean space and 
resources.55 Although it was negotiated before there was widespread 
recognition of climate change and the need for a precautionary, ecosys-
tem approach, instruments negotiated since the Convention’s entry 
into force adapt the Convention’s framework principles to the current 
realities. The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995, for ex-
ample, acknowledges the limitations of the Convention’s “optimum 
use” paradigm for living marine resources. It codifies a precautionary 
approach in setting allowable catches and recognizes the impact of fish-
ing on the health of the marine ecosystem.56 Other instruments go 
even farther in making ecosystem health the central goal of interna-
tional cooperation.57
 Characterized as an “implementing agreement,” the 1995 Agree-
ment directs nations that fish on the high seas to join and cooperate 
with regional ocean governance bodies.58 These bodies in turn must set 
fish conservation measures that take into account the needs of ecologi-
cally associated and dependent species and protect the marine envi-
ronment from adverse fishing impacts.59 The Agreement was the first 
international fisheries treaty to recognize the need to protect marine 
biological diversity.60 It also borrowed some of the elements of the eco-
system approach to fisheries that was written into the fisheries treaty for 
the Southern Ocean under the Antarctic treaty system known as 
                                                                                                                      
55 See United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, pmbl., opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
56 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Manage-
ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, pmbl., opened for signature 
Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement]. The Agreement 
fleshed out the obligations of fishing states with respect to certain high seas fish stocks. See 
Alison Rieser, International Fisheries Law, Overfishing and Marine Biodiversity, 9 Geo. Int’l. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 251, 268–74 (1997). The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees 
the right of all nations to fish on the high seas as long as they cooperate in the conservation 
of fish. See UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 116, at 441. Furthermore, articles 61 and 62 encour-
age coastal nations to make the fish stocks in their 200-mile EEZs available to foreign fishing 
fleets if the local population does not have the capacity to harvest the entire surplus of fish, 
determined in the process of setting total allowable catch levels. Id. at 420–22. The coastal 
nation has a duty to ensure “optimum utilization” of the fish stocks in its EEZ. Id. art. 62, at 
421. States that fish on the high seas have a duty to cooperate in taking measures to ensure 
the conservation of high seas fish stocks that are highly migratory or that straddle the high 
seas and the EEZ pursuant to articles 63 and 64, respectively. Id. at 422–23. 
57 See Currie, supra note 8, at 45–47. 
58 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 56, art. 8, at 1553–54. 
59 Id. art. 9, at 1554–55. 
60 Rieser, supra note 56, at 268. 
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CCAMLR.61 Most notably, the 1995 Agreement broke with the standard 
risk-prone approach of single-species management to require a precau-
tionary approach in setting target and limit fisheries rates and biomass 
levels.62
 While generally-agreed-upon guidelines for implementing an eco-
system-based management of marine systems are lacking, there is con-
sensus that the approach contains a number of elements that are not 
common in conventional fisheries management. Under an ecosystem 
approach, management is based on the properties of the relevant eco-
system rather than on the population dynamics of a single target spe-
cies. Rather than “maximum sustainable yield,” the goal of the ecosys-
tem approach is to maintain the structure and function of ecosystems, 
including their biodiversity and value as habitat.63 In exploiting a fish 
species, measures are adopted to prevent fishing from adversely affect-
ing populations of multiple species and their trophic interactions, in-
cluding predator-prey relationships. In addition to CCAMLR, the eco-
system approach is reflected in a number of multilateral environmental 
agreements, including the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the Madrid Protocol, and the Conven-
tion on Migratory Species.64
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arctic Marine Living Resources art. II, ¶ 3(c), art. IX, ¶ 2(i), May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841 
[hereinafter CCAMLR]. Its members include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, 
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62 See Rieser, supra note 56, at 274. With respect to marine mammals, however, the Law 
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UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 65, at 423. On the high seas, nations are obliged to cooperate 
through international bodies for the study, conservation and management of marine 
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regime of total protection. Id. arts. 64, 120, at 423, 442. These last two provisions do not 
necessarily require that nations act through the International Whaling Commission; they 
could cooperate through another body, either existing or one that they bring into being 
through another instrument. See William T. Burke, A New Whaling Agreement and Interna-
tional Law, in Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime 51, 55 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 
2001). 
63 See, e.g., E.K. Pikitch et al., Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management, 305 Science 346, 346–
47 (2004). 
64 See generally 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Anchorage, U.S., May 28–31, 2007, Eco-
system-Based Management in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Progress Towards Adopting the 
Ecosystem Approach in the International Management of Living Marine Resources, Doc. IWC/59/18 
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 Despite the normative advances of the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement, the regional fisheries bodies have been very slow to adopt 
the new approaches, and fisheries managers have not yet developed 
widely agreed-upon guidelines.65 Even CCAMLR, with its explicit eco-
system objective and management boundary (based on the Antarctic 
Convergence), is making very limited progress, especially in the ecol-
ogically significant krill fishery.66
B. The Impact of the Whaling Regime Stalemate on the Ecosystem Approach 
 As many commentators have noted, the mission and majority 
changed at the IWC in the early 1980s.67 Long considered a whalers’ 
club, it had seemingly presided over the demise of one whale stock af-
ter another. After the Stockholm conference on the environment 
(UNCED) in 1972 at which a nearly unanimous vote supported a global 
moratorium on whaling, the IWC began to entertain resolutions reduc-
ing the catch limits to zero. Several zero quotas were adopted as whale 
stocks fell to levels approaching extinction. The United States delega-
tion, spurred on by environmental groups and the congressional poli-
cies of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, began introducing 
resolutions and campaigning for a total cessation of all whaling.68 In 
1974, the United States reluctantly accepted the Australian govern-
ment’s proposal that instead of a global moratorium, the IWC adopt a 
New Management Procedure, under which quotas would be set on a 
species-specific basis and would be driven by science rather than by the 
demands of the whaling industries of member states.69
 After several years in which new members were encouraged to join 
the IWC in order to support the moratorium, enough votes were pre-
sent to achieve the three-fourths majority needed. In 1982, the IWC 
member states adopted a moratorium on all commercial whaling—in 
the form of a zero-catch quota for all whale species—effective in the 
1986–87 season.70 Although several countries immediately announced 
                                                                                                                      
(May 28, 2007) (prepared by Duncan E.J. Currie), available at http://globelaw.com/Whales/ 
Currie%20Ecosystem%20Approach%20Paper%20for%20IWC.pdf. 
65 A. Willock & M. Lack, WWF Int’l, Follow the Leader: Learning from Experi-
ence and Best Practice in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 16 (2006), 
available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/rfmoreport06.pdf. 
66 See Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 15. 
67 For an extended examination of the changing role of the IWC, see generally Burke, 
supra note 62. 
68 Hogarth Statement, supra note 6. 
69 Id.; see also Carlarne, supra note 3, at 7. 
70 Id. 
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an objection to the resolution, all but Norway were persuaded to with-
draw their objections.71
 Japan was persuaded by the United States to withdraw its objection 
to the moratorium through an agreement with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.72 That same year, however, Japan announced that it was be-
ginning a program of scientific research that would require lethal takes 
of whales in the North Pacific and in the Antarctic.73 This program pro-
vided a means of getting around the moratorium, using the chief ra-
tionale for the moratorium as justification: uncertainty surrounding es-
timates of whale population levels makes it difficult to regulate their 
hunting effectively.74 Japan asserted that its research would improve the 
understanding of certain cetacean species’ population dynamics so that 
sustainable catch limits could be defined.75 The improved information 
could be used by the IWC in the Revised Management Procedure, which 
its Scientific Committee developed in order to set precautionary catch 
limits, and which the IWC formally adopted in 1994.76
 Rejecting this carefully crafted rationale, the United States and 
other IWC member states have consistently opposed the scientific whal-
                                                                                                                      
71 See, e.g., id.; Carlarne, supra note 3, at 39–40; Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Sanctions Against 
Japan for Whaling, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 149, 150 (2001). 
72 Murphy, supra note 71, at 150 & n.10. In exchange for its withdrawal, the executive 
branch agreed to abstain from certifying Japan as a country whose actions undermined the 
decisions of international conservation bodies, potentially triggering an embargo on im-
ports from Japan and the revocation of Japan’s access to fishing in U.S. waters. Id. at 150 
n.10. After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the agreement in Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Ameri-
can Cetacean Society, Japan withdrew the objection, thereby relinquishing the right of its 
nationals to engage in commercial whaling. 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Murphy, supra note 71, at 
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73 Murphy, supra note 71, at 150–51. Article VIII of the ICRW allows state parties to is-
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tained in the reports of the IWC Standing Working Group on Scientific Permits, available 
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74 This rationale has been criticized by a number of scientists who work with the IWC’s 
Scientific Committee. Clapham et al., supra note 11, at 314; see also Phillip J. Clapham et 
al., Whaling as Science, 53 Bioscience 210, 210 (2003) [hereinafter Clapham et al., Whaling 
as Science]. Nevertheless, Japan has conducted continuous programs of “scientific whaling” 
since shortly after the zero-quota moratorium went into effect in 1986. At almost every 
annual meeting of the IWC, Japan introduces a resolution to lift the moratorium and to set 
one or more commercial catch quotas. See Carlarne, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
75 See Morishita, supra note 9, at 804. 
76 See Carlarne, supra note 3, at 14–16; Currie, supra note 8, at 49. 
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ing programs but have had little recourse under the terms of the 
ICRW.77 The United States threatened to levy trade sanctions during 
the Clinton Administration, but these measures were never invoked.78 
As Japan has grown increasingly frustrated by the IWC’s failure to adopt 
the Revised Management Procedure and lift the commercial whaling 
moratorium, it has expanded the scope of its research whaling program 
in both the number and species of whales permitted to be killed.79
 The reluctance of some anti-whaling states to sanction Japan for its 
scientific whaling program is likely due at least in part to the fear that 
Japan will withdraw from the IWC and abrogate the treaty, creating its 
own management body to set quotas for whaling.80 Other observers 
take the view that Japan has more to lose than to gain by withdrawing 
from the Commission. Nevertheless, the commitment of the govern-
ment of Japan to bringing about the resumption of commercial whal-
ing is impressive in the face of such consistent opposition and disap-
proval. This is especially so given that Japan’s whaling industry has 
never been and is unlikely to become a major contributor to the Japa-
nese economy.81
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81 See Amy L. Catalinac & Gerald Chan, Japan, the West, and the Whaling Issue: Under-
standing the Japanese Side, 17 Japan F. 133, 158 n.20 (2005) (indicating sales of whale meat 
from Japan’s research program only cover eighty percent of its costs). For various perspec-
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 The determination of Japan to overturn the whaling moratorium 
and restore commercial whaling under the international regime can be 
understood better when considered in the larger context of global fish-
eries and the emerging norms for their management. The government 
of Japan views the whaling moratorium as a bad precedent that, if emu-
lated by other regional fisheries organizations or governance bodies, 
would threaten Japan’s access to marine resources around the world.82 
Japan was one of the larger fishing states forced to stop large-scale high 
seas driftnet fishing under United Nations General Assembly resolution 
and pressure from the United States and other countries.83 Supporters 
of the driftnet-fishing moratorium justified it on the basis of the pre-
cautionary principle.84 Adverse ecological impacts were also used to 
support the ban despite the limited data on the ecological or species-
population level impacts of the practice.85 Experience with this mani-
festation of the precautionary approach to fisheries has likely left Ja-
pan’s fishery officials with a dim view of the benefits Japan would derive 
from broader application of the principle especially in the manage-
ment of the lucrative international tuna fisheries.86
 To hold the line on what it views as overly restrictive ocean govern-
ance norms that compete for legitimacy with the sustainable use prin-
ciple, the government of Japan is committed to restoring its commer-
cial whaling industry. Some long-time observers of the whaling regime 
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ing, 14 Pacifica Rev. 105 (2002); Sidney J. Holt, Whaling: Will the Phoenix Rise Again?, 54 
Marine Pollution Bull. 1081 (2007). Holt argues that the only logical explanation for 
the Japanese government’s actions is its firm commitment to have large-scale and profit-
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its subsidy. Sidney J. Holt, Propaganda and Pretext, 52 Marine Pollution Bull. 363, 365 
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82 Clapham et al., supra note 11, at 318. 
83 Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources 
of the World’s Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 44/225, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (Dec. 
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84 See, e.g., James Carr & Matthew Gianni, High Seas Fisheries, Large-Scale Drift Nets, and 
the Law of the Sea, in Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century 272, 281 ( Jon M. Van 
Dyke et al. eds., 1993). See generally Virginia M. Walsh, Eliminating Driftnets from the North 
Pacific Ocean: U.S.-Japanese Cooperation in the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
1953–1993, 29 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 295 (1998). 
85 Carr & Gianni, supra note 84, at 280–81. 
86 See, e.g., Kazuo Sumi, The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Drift Nets, with 
Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses, in Freedom for the Seas in the 21st 
Century, supra note 84, at 292, 300–02 (defending driftnet fishing). 
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are convinced that Japan’s long-range plan is to work with other mem-
ber states to build the three-fourths majority necessary to lift the zero-
catch quota provision that effectuates the moratorium and put in place 
the Revised Management Scheme that will be the basis for setting catch 
quotas.87 Japan’s goal is to keep the IWC focused on setting quotas for 
whaling. This narrow focus on the IWC as a bulwark against excessively 
conservation-oriented fisheries governance also helps explain why Ja-
pan’s delegation has opposed efforts to expand the agenda of the IWC 
to include conservation issues and the effects of climate change.88
 Most assessments of the state of fisheries take a very different view 
of current ocean governance regimes and attribute declining fish 
catches to overfishing and inadequate management of fisheries under 
the sustainable use paradigm.89 Ocean diplomacy has begun to focus 
on reforming the regional management bodies through which member 
states coordinate their conservation and management of high seas fish-
eries. With increasing frequency, parties to multilateral agreements are 
expressing the view that fisheries can adversely affect marine biological 
diversity, including via resolutions by parties to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity.90 International trade is threatening some fish species 
with extinction, either through directed fisheries or from incidental 
catch in industrial fisheries.91 The consensus appears to be that ocean 
governance needs to be more, not less, precautionary and ecosystem-
based.92
 In contrast, Japanese delegates at the IWC and Japan’s representa-
tives on the IWC’s Scientific Committee have suggested that depressed 
fish stocks may be a sign that recovering whale populations are taking 
the fish.93 Japan and other pro-whaling states argue that it may be nec-
essary to cull top predators to reduce their take of fish species that are 
needed for human consumption and food security, citing the drastic 
declines in world fisheries to advance a new rationale for commercial 
whaling.94 According to this view, whales eat fish from coastal waters 
where people would otherwise fish, leading to an imbalance in some 
marine ecosystems. In order to restore fish populations and ensure the 
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88 See generally Iliff, supra note 18. 
89 Holt, Propaganda and Pretext, supra note 81, at 365. 
90 See Currie, supra note 64, at 40–42. 
91 See id. at 45–46. 
92 See generally Willock & Lack, supra note 65. 
93 Clapham et al., supra note 11, at 315. 
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food security of coastal nations, cetaceans should be hunted to reduce 
their numbers and thus make whales’ prey species available to fish 
which can then be available for human consumption.95
 Proponents of this view assert it as the scientific rationale for the 
pro-whaling resolutions at the IWC. They argue that the opposition’s 
insistence on maintaining the moratorium is a case of emotional at-
tachment to whales blinding one’s ecological and scientific judgment. 
This argument is disturbing to some fishery scientists, as it seems to at-
tribute the overexploitation of the world’s fishery resources to marine 
mammals instead of to human fisheries.96 This theory has emerged 
from scientific papers resulting from the Japanese program of article 
VIII whaling. 
 More than just a variation on the sustainable-use argument used in 
the past, this view has a more sinister aspect, conveying as it does an 
over-simplification of our understanding of marine ecosystems and a 
likely deliberate distortion of the scientific evidence in order to ad-
vance the “sustainable whaling” agenda.97 Some of the new members of 
the IWC recruited from the ranks of developing nations to support this 
view include small-island and coastal states from the Caribbean, West 
Africa, and the Pacific. These states have concerns for the viability of 
their tuna and coastal fish stocks, the economic prospects of their do-
mestic fishing industries, and the food security of their citizens.98 Mis-
understanding the reasons behind these stocks’ conditions makes them 
even more vulnerable to changes brought by warming oceans. 
 The “whales are eating our fish” argument fails to explain why his-
torically there were both higher fish biomass and marine mammal 
populations.99 Moreover, there is often very little overlap between the 
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argument put forth by pro-whaling proponents), available at http://www.hsus.org/web-
files/PDF/hsi/daniel-pauly-paper-iwc-2008-pdf-doc.pdf. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 9–10. 
98 Id. at 10–11. In an essay reprinted in the report’s appendix, Daniel Pauly describes 
the chagrin expressed by members of the parliament of Senegal, when at a workshop on 
the issue, national fishery officials expressed the whales-eat-our-fish rationale. Id. at 29–30. 
Pauly reports that the members said those views were contrary to the information they 
received from fishers in their communities on the causes of the decline of coastal fisheries 
and was also contrary to the nation’s cultural admiration for cetaceans. Id. at 30. 
99 See Swartz & Pauly, supra note 95, at 5–6. It is likely that the historically large whale 
populations were in part responsible for the massive fish populations. Baleen whales, if 
they eat fish at all, eat tiny, larval stages of fish, in addition to zooplankton and phytoplank-
ton. Id. at 5. This may have had the evolutionary effect of pushing fish populations to 
evolve into short-lived (high-fecundity) animals that could grow fast and avoid being eaten. 
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food preferences of cetaceans and of commercial fisheries, nor do they 
overlap spatially. Most great whales, for example, feed in high latitude 
places for species that are not accessible to fishing gear and are not de-
sirable for human consumption.100
 This alternative view of the ecosystem approach reached its high 
water mark at the IWC in 2006. At the annual meeting that year, the 
Commission adopted a resolution acknowledging that ecosystem-based 
management is the new international standard and that whale stocks 
must be considered in a broader ecological context.101 But in a logic 
that appears to turn the ecosystem approach on its head, the resolution 
suggests that whales may need to be culled in order to ensure food se-
curity,102 or at the very least that nations should continue “scientific 
whaling” until such time as the ecological role of whales in fishery eco-
systems is clarified.103
                                                                                                                      
 
Id. at 5–6. This effect has been reversed by fisheries, which by targeting larger fish, have 
been giving selective pressure for fish to grow slowly and mature later with lower productiv-
ity. Id. at 6. 
100 Id. at 8. 
101 IWC, St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, IWC Res. 2006-1 (2006), http://www.iwcoffice. 
org/_documents/commission/IWC58docs/Resolution2006-1.pdf. 
102 See, e.g., Peter Corkeron, Letter to the Editor, Fishery Management and Culling, 306 
Science 1891, 1891 (2004); Peter Yodzis, Must Top Predators Be Culled for the Sake of Fisheries?, 
16 Trends In Ecology & Evolution 78, 79 (2001). This is despite the fact that several 
scientific studies dispute the value of culling to increase fish stocks. See Corkeron, supra, at 
1891; Yodzis, supra, at 80–81. Corkeron reports that the Norwegian Parliament, in May 
2004, endorsed a new national policy for marine resources that would establish an ecosys-
tem-based management regime for marine mammals in Norway’s marine waters. Cork-
eron, supra, at 1891. In order to increase fisheries production, this policy will presumably 
be translated into larger quotas for the hunting of minke whales, harp seals and coastal 
seals in the sub-Arctic and Arctic waters in Norway’s exclusive economic zone to reduce 
these populations’ “competition” with humans for fish. Id. 
103 See IWC, supra note 101. A group of Caribbean nations introduced the Declaration 
in a resolution after Japan’s proposed resolutions to amend the Schedule to set quotas for 
its four coastal whaling communities for North Pacific minke, Bryde’s and sperm whales 
were voted down. IWC, 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, St. Kitts and Nevis, June 16–20, 
2006, Agenda Item 19: St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, at 1–2, Doc. IWC/58/16 ( June 17, 
2006), available at http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC58docs/58-16.pdf. 
The resolution included the following statement: 
ACCEPTING that scientific research has shown that whales consume huge 
quantities of fish making the issue a matter of food security for coastal nations 
and requiring that the issue of management of whale stocks must be consid-
ered in a broader context of ecosystem management since eco-system man-
agement has now become an international standard. 
IWC, supra note 101. Of the thirty-three countries that voted for the St. Kitts and Nevis 
Declaration, fourteen are classified as low-income, food-deficient countries by the FAO. See 
FAO.org, Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIDFC), http://www.fao.org/countrypro- 
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 This interpretation of the ecosystem approach makes no mention 
of the need for ocean governance bodies to reduce human fisheries to 
maintain predator diversity and the predator-prey relationships charac-
terizing healthy marine ecosystems. Nor does it suggest it may be neces-
sary to reserve portions of prey species’ biomass for whales as their 
populations recover and they adapt to climate change, rather than 
simply assuming that the maximum amount of exploitable biomass can 
be taken for human use. Moreover, the IWC’s ecosystem approach reso-
lution in no way advances any of the ecosystem health needs of cetace-
ans by urging action to prevent habitat degradation from pollution, lost 
or active fishing gear, noise, ship strikes, and climate change.104 It 
merely asserts the ecosystem approach as justification for returning the 
IWC to the task of setting catch quotas for whaling.105
 The culling hypothesis now serves as the scientific rationale for the 
extensive whaling carried out in the Southern Ocean under a special 
permit issued by the Government of Japan.106 Although the value of 
these investigations has been challenged publically by leading cetacean 
scientists,107 the international whaling regime has no mechanism to 
force it to be terminated.108 But, the longer the scientific whaling pro-
gram continues, the harder anti-whaling proponents hang on to the 
                                                                                                                      
files/lifdc.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). This is cited as evidence that the argument based 
on food security as well as the financial assistance offered to domestic fisheries by Japan 
has influenced the size of the pro-whaling faction. It has been noted that some of the same 
countries that expressed concern for food security in voting for the Declaration have not 
joined the regional fishery body that manages tuna and other fish stocks in their EEZs, 
even though its membership fee is lower than the IWC’s. Swartz & Pauly, supra note 95, 
at 12. 
104 IWC, supra note 64, at 55. 
105 See id. at 57–58. Others have suggested that the declaration lays the groundwork for 
setting whale catch quotas in the Antarctic that are higher than would otherwise result from 
the Scientific Committee’s application of the highly precautionary Revised Management 
Procedure. See, e.g., David M. Lavigne & Sheryl Fink, IFAW, Whales & Fisheries 4 (2001) 
available at http://www.ifaw.org/Publications/Program_Publications/Whales/asset_upload_ 
file954_12140.pdf. 
106 See Normile, supra note 73, at 2265. Japan’s Institute of Cetacean Research operates 
a factory-whaling fleet in the Antarctic and each year kills hundreds of whales so that their 
stomach contents can be analyzed to determine if they compete with humans for marine 
resources. See id. Under this rationale, Japan’s researchers added Bryde’s and sperm 
whales to the scientific whaling program. See id. 
107 Id.; see also Clapham et al., Whaling as Science, supra note 74. 
108 See Normile, supra note 73, at 2264. Because the whaling is carried out under the 
special permit provision of article VIII, Japan believes that the activities of its fleet are not 
subject to the regulations contained in the IWC’s Schedule, including the Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary and the ban on factory whale ships. See ICRW, supra note 5, sched. ¶ 7(b) n.**, 
available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf. 
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moratorium. The longer the moratorium stays in place, the bigger and 
more audacious the scientific whaling program becomes, despite the 
weaknesses in its ecosystem-based rationale. Meanwhile, the ability of 
the IWC to address ecological and environmental challenges to whales 
is stymied by the impasse. 
 The IWC’s whales and ecosystems resolution may ultimately have 
little impact on the whaling moratorium at the IWC or, if the morato-
rium is ever lifted, on the setting of sustainable catch quotas under the 
Revised Management Procedure. But the possibility that some member 
states may actually accept the premise of the ecosystem resolution does 
not bode well for progress by other regional fishery management bod-
ies. To keep their fleets fishing, fishing states frequently look for eco-
logical reasons to explain declining fish stocks, such as a reduction in 
the environment’s carrying capacity. As in the case of western Atlantic 
bluefin tuna, whenever a marginally plausible ecological explanation is 
found, states can rationalize putting off decisions to reduce the size and 
capacity of the industrial fishing fleets or maintaining high catch rates 
of top predators.109 States with large distant-water fishing fleets need 
only find one scientist who is willing to express the view that recovering 
whales or some other ecological phenomenon may be responsible for 
the poor conditions of certain fish stocks.110 Scientific uncertainty, pre-
sented at the time when precautionary action is most needed, has often 
given cover to management officials who give greater weight to short-
term economics than long-term ecosystem health and sustainability.111
III. The IWC and Precautionary Management of the Antarctic 
Marine Ecosystem 
 The best rationale for retaining the whaling regime is its potential 
to influence other governance regimes on behalf of whales.112 The ques-
tion is whether in order to reach the agreement needed to permit the 
whaling regime to perform this function, it will be necessary to com-
                                                                                                                      
109 See Safina & Klinger, supra note 12, at 244–45. 
110 See id. 
111 See generally Andrew A. Rosenberg, Managing to the Margins: The Overexploitation of 
Fisheries, 1 Frontiers In Ecology & Env’t 102 (2003). 
112 See Burns, supra note 5, at 354. As a regime that failed to achieve its basic objective 
of ensuring a sustainable fishery, the IWC can serve as a cautionary tale for other govern-
ance regimes, providing testament to the need for setting catch limits that are truly pre-
cautionary; for not disregarding scientific advice; for requiring verifiable and timely re-
porting of all catch and other data, supported by an effective compliance and infractions 
program; and for a mechanism for resolving disagreements over treaty interpretation that 
does not rely on an objection or opt-out clause. 
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promise on principles in a manner that would make the whaling regime 
ineffective or, worse, counterproductive. For example, the pro-whaling 
member states’ interpretation of the ecosystem approach may continue 
to be based on the premise that “whales are eating our fish.”113 If so, the 
International Whaling Commission’s (IWC’s) contribution to manage-
ment of fisheries targeting prey species will undermine rather than en-
hance efforts to ensure that dependent and ecologically associated spe-
cies are not adversely affected, as required by the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement.114 Instead of ensuring that catch quotas are set low enough 
to protect foraging grounds for whales, the participation of whaling 
states holding this interpretation of the ecosystem approach could lead 
to higher quotas for prey, to “cull” whales indirectly by reducing their 
food sources. 
 Developments in the management of Antarctic krill suggest that 
these concerns are not merely academic. Japan and Norway, fishing 
states that promote the culling hypothesis at the IWC and elsewhere, 
are also major participants in the developing Antarctic krill fishery.115 
Krill is managed by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), a regional body that has a repu-
tation for being the most ecosystem-based and precautionary of all in-
ternational fisheries regimes.116
 CCAMLR is well regarded because its treaty was the first interna-
tional agreement to build ecosystem and precautionary principles into 
its management regime, serving as the model for the innovative provi-
sions of the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement.117 CCAMLR incorpo-
rates these principles because it was founded for the purpose of manag-
ing fishing for krill in the Southern Ocean. With such an ecologically 
                                                                                                                      
113 See discussion supra notes 97–103. 
114 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 56, art. 5. 
115 See Nicol & Foster, supra note 51, tbl.1; Andrew Darby, Ecologists Fear Huge Rise in 
Krill Catch, Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 5, 2007, available at http://www.smh.com.au/ 
articles/2007/11/04/1194117879703.html. 
116 Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 14; see Philip Bender, The Precautionary Approach 
and Management of the Antarctic Krill, 18 J. Envtl. L. 229, 232–33 (2006). 
117 Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 14. Living resources management in the South-
ern Ocean, however, has a somewhat checkered history. See A.J. Constable, Sustainable 
Fisheries in a High Latitude, Nov. 2001(unpublished paper presented at symposium of the 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering), available at http://www. 
atse.org.au/index.php?sectionid=324. Both cetaceans and seals were hunted heavily and 
the result was extirpation and near extinction for many species despite the adoption of 
international conservation agreements. The Agreement for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals was adopted as part of the Antarctic Treaty System, as is CCAMLR, supra note 61, and 
was negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties after entry into force of the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1959. Constable, supra. 
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significant species as the target for the fisheries, the CCAMLR treaty 
adopted an ecological boundary for its management area and stan-
dards requiring fisheries to be controlled in order to maintain the eco-
logical relationships between harvested, dependent, and related popu-
lations of Antarctic marine resources.118
 Despite CCAMLR’s advantages, in the face of pressure to expand 
fishing opportunities, states with fisheries operating in the Southern 
Ocean have resisted precautionary management, preventing the re-
gime from fulfilling the promise reflected in its treaty provisions.119 
Fishing pressure in the Southern Ocean is on the rise as declining fish 
stocks in the Northern Hemisphere have sent vessels south in search of 
unexploited species to replace them. The Patagonian toothfish (Dissos-
tichus eleginoides) is the most well-known of these quarries, becoming 
the target of rampant illegal fishing by vessels registered by CCAMLR 
member states and by open-registry states that may or may not be co-
operating with CCAMLR.120
 Fishing companies are also searching for abundant marine species 
that can be converted into fish feed. The international fish-farming in-
dustry has grown tremendously as catches in capture fisheries have de-
clined due to overfishing.121 This had led to intense interest in the Ant-
arctic krill (Euphausia superba), the species at the center of the marine 
food web in the Antarctic, and a key prey species for baleen whales and 
for the fishes that are preyed on by toothed whales.122
                                                                                                                      
118 CCAMLR, supra note 61, arts. I, II(3)(b), at 842–43. The boundary of the Conven-
tion area reflects the ecological boundary formed by the Antarctic Convergence (a frontal 
zone where currents carrying cold Antarctic waters and the warmer sub-Antarctic waters 
meet). These farsighted provisions are likely due to the low level of fishing pressure at the 
time it was negotiated and the significant role played by the international scientific re-
search community in creating the Antarctic Treaty System. Growth in the krill fishery was 
anticipated, however, and the potential for a massive krill fishery was viewed as a threat to 
the entire Antarctic marine ecosystem. See Constable, supra note 117. It is somewhat ironic 
that the precautionary management procedures and methods for assessing the potential 
yield of exploited whale populations developed by the IWC’s Scientific Committee in the 
late 1970s and 1980s inspired CCAMLR’s approach. See id. 
119 See generally Gascon & Werner, supra note 29. 
120 See Philip Bender, A State of Necessity: IUU Fishing in the CCAMLR Zone, 13 Ocean & 
Coastal L.J. 233, 237 (2008). See generally G. Bruce Knecht, Hooked: Pirates, Poaching 
and the Perfect Fish (2006) (discussing illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish—also 
known as Chilean Sea Bass—by flags of convenience fishing vessels). 
121 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization predicts that world aqua-
culture production will increase significantly and is already responsible for over seventy 
percent of the increase in fish production, with China and southeast Asian countries be-
coming the largest producers. See Rebecca Goldburg & Rosamond Naylor, Future Seascapes, 
Fishing, and Fish Farming, 3 Frontiers In Ecology & Env’t 21, 21 (2005). 
122 See Bender, supra note 116, at 230, 234. 
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 Under its mandate to manage fisheries with precaution and on an 
ecosystem basis, CCAMLR has adopted several well-conceived provi-
sions for the krill fishery. These include a more conservative total catch 
quota than the conventional maximum sustainable yield model pro-
duces, subdivided into smaller areas.123 For example, the quota for the 
area around the Antarctic Peninsula and the islands of South Orkney 
and South Georgia is capped at four million metric tons per season.124 
Because krill fishing vessels tend to concentrate in areas where land-
based predators such as penguins and seals need to forage, CCAMLR 
also created fifteen smaller units, allowing quotas to be fined-tuned to 
prevent localized depletion of krill during the nesting season.125
 To meet the growing interest in krill-based products, a diversified 
maritime company based in Norway, Aker BioMarine, has now devel-
oped a technology that allows one krill fishing vessel to take nearly as 
many tons per season as has been taken by all krill-fishing vessels in an 
entire season in the polar fishery using the old methods.126 New vessels 
are being constructed to replace the older, less efficient ones. As this 
happens, CCAMLR parties seem less willing to apply the ecosystem and 
precautionary approaches to the krill fishery. Krill is the only CCAMLR-
managed fishery that is exempt from the requirement to board scien-
tific observers on the vessels, contrary to the advice from CCAMLR’s 
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. at 233–34. 
124 CCAMLR, Precautionary Catch Limitations on Euphausia Superba in Statistical Area 48, 
Conservation Measure 32/XIX (2001–2002), http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/01- 
02/cm32-XIX.pdf; see Bender, supra note 116, at 234. 
125 Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 15. CCAMLR agreed to subdivide the Southwest 
Atlantic area (Area 48) into fifteen small-scale management units around the Antarctic Pen-
insula and the islands of South Orkney and South Georgia in 2002. See id. If the fishery in a 
given season ever reaches a 620,000-ton level, under CCAMLR’s measures this will trigger 
further subdividing the quota among the smaller areas in order to protect penguin and seal 
rookeries that depend on the availability of abundant krill. See CCAMLR, supra note 124. 
However, while CCAMLR has not be able to reach consensus on how to allocate the krill 
catch limit among these areas, the krill fishery continues to grow, with new vessels being 
identified for participation every year. Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 15. The idea be-
hind precautionary measures is to have them in place before the industrial fishery develops 
and sets expectations for future seasons. Until these precautionary measures to protect de-
pendent species can be agreed to, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), the 
leading NGO participating in CCAMLR scientific and plenary meetings, has urged CCAMLR 
to freeze the expansion of the krill fishery in these critical areas while models are being built 
to help determine the level of krill exploitation the system can tolerate and appropriate 
compliance measures are put in place. Bender, supra note 116, at 234. The ASOC papers 
submitted to CCAMLR are available online at http://www.asoc.org/. 
126 See Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 14, 16; Darby, supra note 115; see also MSC 
Press Release, supra note 52. 
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scientific committee that such information is crucial.127 The krill-
fishing states have also blocked adoption of recommendations to ex-
pand the monitoring program, which is designed to detect whether 
ecologically related species are being adversely affected by exploitation 
of the krill.128 Krill-fishing states like Japan blocked consensus approval 
of the observer requirement at the 2008 meeting of CCAMLR, despite 
a commitment in 2007 to adopt the program in 2008.129 Likewise, fish-
ing states have blocked a management procedure that would adjust 
control measures in response to the ecosystem-monitoring program.130
 Shortly after the IWC adopted a standing committee to address 
conservation issues, it also directed its Scientific Committee to work 
with the CCAMLR on its ecosystem approach. This work includes pro-
viding CCAMLR with the scientific information it needs to construct a 
model of the Antarctic marine ecosystem and to better manage the krill 
fishery.131 The best mathematical models in the world, however, cannot 
compensate for a lack of data, especially if the goal is to model the ef-
fects of exploiting one population on other species. The joint IWC-
CCAMLR modeling effort is hindered by the krill-fishing states’ unwill-
ingness to submit catch and other data to CCAMLR and to require that 
scientific observers be placed on krill vessels. By depriving the modelers 
of the information they need, these states are acting more to protect 
their companies’ competitive advantage than to protect the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem. 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 15–16. 
128 See 27th Annual Meeting of CCAMLR, Hobart, Austl., Oct 27–Nov. 7, 2008, Report of 
the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Commission, at 11–14 [hereinafter CCAMLR, Report of the 
Twenty-Seventh Meeting], available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/cr/08/all.pdf. 
The monitoring program is one of the measures upon which CCAMLR’s reputation for 
strong ecosystem-based management is based. Previously, Commission members agreed to 
research on the status of ecologically related species and to make changes in conservation 
and management measures for fisheries if the evidence showed they were being adversely 
affected. See Gascon & Werner, supra note 29, at 15. 
129 See CCAMLR, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 128, at 56, 180; Press Re-
lease, Antarctic & S. Ocean Coal. [ASOC], International Antarctic Meeting Falls Short of 
Providing Needed Protection to Antarctic Marine Ecosystems under Threat (Nov. 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter ASOC Press Release], available at http://www.krillcount.jp/pdf/ASOC%20 
CCAMLR%20Results%20Press%20Release%20112408.pdf. 
130 See CCAMLR, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, supra note 128, at 11–14; ASOC 
Press Release, supra note 129. In 2007, krill-fishing parties agreed to require their vessels to 
have Vessel Monitoring Systems so that they could monitor their catches during the fishing 
season. See 26th Annual Meeting of CCAMLR, Hobart, Austl., Oct 22–Nov. 2, 2007, Report 
of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Commission, at 54, http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/ 
cr/07/all.pdf. 
131 See IWC, Joint IWC/CCAMLR Workshop on Ecosystem Modelling, http://www.iw- 
coffice.org/sci_com/workshops/IWC-CCAMLRworkshop.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). 
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Conclusion 
 Despite the apparent willingness of IWC member states to cooper-
ate with CCAMLR’s ecosystem-based management, some member states 
are at the same time using CCAMLR to block measures aimed at mini-
mizing the indirect effects of fishing on cetaceans and other krill 
predators.132 Considering this contradiction, it is not immediately ap-
parent how reform of the IWC could help. It is conceivable the whaling 
negotiators could use Japan’s desire to restore commercial whaling in 
non-Antarctic waters as leverage for reform of CCAMLR’s krill man-
agement. This kind of cross-regime horse-trading is probably not un-
common, but if it does exist, there is little evidence that it results in 
anything other than more extractions from ecosystems. But if the re-
form compromise allows the pro-whaling states who represent a small 
minority among IWC member states to prevail in exchange for progress 
in krill regulation, the whole enterprise of international cooperation in 
marine ecosystem management would suffer a huge setback. This 
seems an unnecessarily high price, especially given that Japan’s claims 
of right under the ICRW to its scientific whaling program have such a 
shaky legal foundation.133 It seems that international adjudication 
would be better suited to clarifying what the legal obligations are of 
parties to the whaling regime. If diplomacy to resolve the whaling re-
gime stalemate can only succeed by compromising norms that were 
earned the hard way, diplomacy in that case is really not working. In-
deed it may be better to litigate than accommodate.134
                                                                                                                      
 
132 See ASOC Press Release, supra note 129. 
133 The International Fund for Animal Welfare asked a committee of independent legal 
experts to prepare a legal analysis of the scientific whaling issue, including its legality under 
the ICRW and other international law. The panel concluded that a legal challenge to the 
scientific whaling program would likely succeed at the International Court of Justice or the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) under the international law theory of 
abuse of rights and several international treaties, including the ICRW, UNCLOS and 
CCAMLR. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al., Report of the International 
Panel of Independent Legal Experts On: Special Permit (“Scientific”) Whaling Un-
der International Law, (2006), http://www.mardecetaceos.net/media_files/ download/ 
CompleteParisReport001.pdf. The panel members were Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Donald R. Rothwell, Philippe Sands, Alberto Székely, William H. Taft IV, 
and Kate Cook. The Australian Government has been under pressure by NGOs to pursue 
such litigation. See, e.g., Donald R. Rothwell, Time to End Loophole “Scientific” Whaling, Cosmos 
Online, July 31, 2007, http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/node/1510. 
134 After Australia and New Zealand challenged Japan’s experimental fishing for 
southern bluefin tuna under the UNCLOS dispute resolution provisions, ITLOS con-
cluded that the dispute concerned legal as well as scientific questions and that all parties 
should take measures to avert further deterioration of the stock. Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), ¶¶ 79, 80, 38 I.L.M. 1624 (Int’l Trib. L. of 
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 Obviously, the best way that U.S. ocean diplomacy can serve the 
long-range interests of cetaceans is to adopt a serious program to com-
bat global warming by rapidly transitioning to a non-carbon based 
economy.135 In addition, the United States can redouble its efforts to 
ensure that standards for international shipping require the construc-
tion of quieter vessels that burn cleaner fuels and can slow down— es-
pecially where shipping lanes cross whale migration routes—and avoid 
whale foraging grounds altogether. It should set a global example by 
scaling down commercial fisheries that deploy and leave fishing gear in 
whale habitat and insist that international regimes require the same. If, 
in the meantime, the Obama Administration wants to resolve the im-
passe over commercial whaling, it must be cognizant of the normative 
impact of such action. Any reform must advance and not set back the 
progress of the last fifteen years. The need for reform is much greater 
in other regimes; a regime for whaling that is very costly to reform is 
not worth the price. Greater effort at other international bodies to ad-
vance precautionary and ecosystem approaches will in the long run do 
more for whales in a warming ocean than a less acrimonious IWC.136
                                                                                                                      
the Sea 1999). The Arbitral Panel later found it had no jurisdiction due to the dispute 
settlement provision (article 16) of the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), 39 
I.L.M. 1359, 1393 (UNCLOS Arbitral Trib. 2000). Despite the litigation, the working rela-
tionship among the litigants improved at the Commission for the Conservation of South-
ern Bluefin Tuna, even though Japan revealed that it had grossly underreported bluefin 
imports in the previous twenty years. See Alastair Cameron, Is There Hope for Fish?: The Post-
Arbitration Effectiveness of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 15 
N.Y.U. L. Envtl. L. J. 247, 264–66 (2007); see also Ana Parma, Southern Blues: The Chal-
lenge of Managing by Consensus to Sustain an International Tuna Fishery, Abstract of Pres-
entation at the University of Washington Bevan Series on Sustainable Fisheries (Mar. 2, 
2006), http://courses.washington.edu/susfish/2006/ 
speakers/parma.html. 
135 See generally Burns, supra note 5. 
136 Just before the IWC’s annual meeting in 2007, three NGOs hosted a workshop in 
Dakar, Senegal to discuss the claim that whales are responsible for declining fish catches. 
The workshop inspired one participant to later conclude: 
The most crucial reform would be moving from a situation where West Afri-
can waters are seen as larder from which an endless supply of fish can be ex-
tracted to supply foreign markets . . . to one where West African countries 
could build on export and processing of fish to strengthen their own econ-
omy, and benefit their own people . . . . [But] such reforms are not being 
contemplated. [T]op fisheries officials of West African countries appear to 
have thrown their lot with their Japanese advisors, and their ‘whales-eat-our-
fish’ mantra, for reasons that are either obscure, or too obvious to mention. 
Swartz & Pauly, supra note 95, at 29–30. 
 INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
 
